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THE PROBLEMS WITH MORAL SUBJECTIVISM 
 
Seow Hon Tan* 
 
Moral dialogue for moral subjectivists is gravely limited. As soon as moral 
subjectivists hold another person to any moral standard independent of the 
person’s belief, they must give up their moral subjectivism. Some moral 
subjectivists might turn out to be moral realists who accord primacy to 
autonomy. This, however, is a senseless position that renders all persons 
equally worthless, unless such moral realists concede that norms that limit 
autonomy exist. But if so, they are not different from any other moral realists 
after all.  
 
According to moral realists, moral facts and properties exist which are independent of 
a subject’s thinking, belief or feeling. Of an act such as Lucy slugging her brother 
Linus as and when she feels crabby, it can be said that the act is wrong. A statement 
that Lucy’s act is wrong is not merely a statement about Linus’s belief or Lucy’s 
feeling of guilt. It involves a claim about the properties of Lucy’s action — a claim 
that can be true or false. If two persons disagree about whether Lucy is wrong to slug 
Linus whenever she feels like it, one of them is wrong.  
 
In contrast, moral subjectivists, who are opponents of moral realism, are of the view 
that moral judgments depend on the perception of the subject. 
 
Moral subjectivists, such as David Hume, may be non-cognitivists who take the view 
that claims about right and wrong resemble expressions of emotions, which cannot be 
true or false. Strictly, not all moral subjectivists are non-cognitivists, as moral 
subjectivists may think moral opinions can be true or false to particular individuals 
and may not regard them as mere sentiments.  
 
Moral sceptics are another group of opponents of moral realism. There are different 
forms of moral scepticism. Moral sceptics may be sceptical about the existence of an 																																																								
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objective standard of morality; or they may be sceptical that such an objective 
standard can be known. Moral sceptics of the first sort — a more severe form of 
scepticism — are necessarily moral subjectivists.  
 
Another stance on morality is moral relativism. Moral relativists may be relativistic in 
different manners: the emotive meta-ethical relativism of Bertrand Russell, for 
example, is essentially non-cognitivism, while cultural relativists think that each 
culture has its own standard of right and wrong. Cultural relativism is a form of moral 
subjectivism. 
 
I shall demonstrate that moral dialogue for moral subjectivists is gravely limited. As 
soon as moral subjectivists attempt to hold another person to their moral standards 
independent of the person’s belief, thinking or feeling, they must give up their moral 
subjectivism. Moral subjectivists are likely to hold another person to their moral 
standards paradoxically when they insist on certain corollaries arising out of the 
nature of morality being subjective. I shall explore the problems of moral 
subjectivism, first, by examining the position of cultural relativism, as a subset of 
moral subjectivism, and then by considering moral subjectivism in general. Next, I 
shall consider why moral subjectivism seems appealing at first blush, and suggest that 
the reasons for its appeal are inconclusive. I shall conclude with the problem 
confronting moral subjectivists who turn out to be moral realists. 
 
Cultural Relativism   
 
Cultural relativists are moral subjectivists who think that morality is culturally 
subjective. Unpacking the exact claim of cultural relativism throws up some 
difficulties.  
 
First, it is not clear how a culture is to be defined. Is culture constituted by race, 
religion or nationality? Commonly, claims of cultural relativism are made by nation 
states that resist what they perceive to be the imperialism of other nations that 
maintain that human rights are universal and require these nations subscribing to 
cultural relativism to respect such rights for their own citizens. In a non-racially or 
non-religiously homogenous country that subscribes to cultural relativism, are its 
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‘culturally’ relativistic norms the norms of the majority or dominant group? If so, 
those making the claim ironically neglect to honour the culture of minority groups.  
 
Second, even if we could agree on a definition of ‘culture’ in cultural relativism, it is 
questionable what cultural relativism entails for others beyond the group. Are others 
bound to respect the culturally relativistic norms of one group when they belong to a 
different group governed in their view by a different set of cultural norms? At first 
blush, it would seem that the obvious answer is they are not bound in this manner. But 
a claim of cultural relativism in fact often ends up requiring others to respect a 
group’s right to be governed by the group’s norms to the exclusion of other groups’ 
norms, in that sense binding others. If a cultural relativist, P, does not think that P’s 
group norms bind another person, Q, from a different culture, except that P insists that 
Q’s culturally relativistic group norms also cannot bind P, P’s stance is ironically only 
superficially culturally relativistic. P’s stance in substance holds Q to a meta-cultural 
standard that attempts to bind Q to respect P’s entitlement to be governed by P’s 
group norms rather than Q’s group norms, even if Q’s culture does not endorse such 
an entitlement. Cultural relativism suggests norms are relative to culture, but P is 
found to endorse a norm that P cannot insist is merely subjective, as P seeks to bind Q 
whether or not Q endorses P’s group norms. The norm’s content appears to be 
tantamount to a right to self-determination by each culture. P must therefore explain 
why such a right exists. If it exists, for example, because each cultural group is 
constituted by persons who have equal moral worth and may thus together choose the 
norms that govern their group, the insistence that Q must respect P’s group norms 
insofar as it governs P, even if Q does not agree, suggests that P subscribes to a norm 
that is neither culturally relativistic nor constituted by agreement. P is found to 
subscribe to an absolute norm that, stripped to its core, honours the equal moral worth 
of persons. Therefore, P is a moral realist. P’s view as to the absolutist nature of the 
particular norm of cultural self-determination can also be challenged; that is, P can be 
questioned about why cultural self-determination has primacy over other possible 
values.  
 
If P, on the other hand, remains true to subjectivism, P must not be found to hold Q to 
any of P’s group norms. If Q subscribes to another set of group norms in Q’s version 
of cultural relativism, and if some of Q’s norms concern P’s conduct, P cannot 
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persuade Q otherwise while staying true to cultural relativism. Moral dialogue breaks 
down. 
 
Suppose, instead, that R, from a different culture, happens to be a moral realist who 
subscribes to the existence of universal human rights. If P insists that R must respect 
P’s right to be governed by P’s group norms, P has similarly given up on P’s moral 
subjectivism.   
 
A Further Illustration of Possible Moral Dialogues 
 
A hypothetical scenario illustrates the preceding points. 
 
Suppose that there are two neighbouring countries, both of which subscribe to cultural 
relativism. In Country A, persons of Race X form the majority and persons of Race Y 
form the minority. In Country B, it is the opposite: persons of Race Y form the 
majority and persons of Race X form the minority.  
 
One day, the government of Country A (‘Government A’) decides to eliminate all 
Race Y citizens, justifying its genocide by reference to its culturally relativistic norm, 
according to which persons of Race X have equal moral worth but persons of Race Y 
are regarded as sub-human and have no entitlement to human rights. At this juncture, 
the government of Country B (‘Government B’), with a dominant majority of Race Y 
citizens, seeks to intervene to save Race Y citizens of Country A. What can 
Government A and Government B say to each other if they attempt to engage in a 
moral dialogue, instead of using brute force to resolve their differences?   
 
Suppose we leave international law out of the picture for our discussion. After all, 
Government A cannot pick and choose international law norms to suit its purposes. It 
would like to tell Government B to mind its own business but cannot reasonably rely 
on international law principles relating to national sovereignty and assert an 
entitlement to do whatever it pleases within its own territories if it is planning to 
violate a jus cogens norm against genocide. Even though the violation of the jus 
cogens norm might not entitle Government B, a sovereign nation, to unilaterally 
decide to intervene, Government A is unlikely to want to put itself in the situation 
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when an international institution acts against it based upon international law norms 
against genocide, or subject itself to the sanctions of international criminal law later. 
Leaving international law aside, how might the moral dialogue go? 
 
Government A might assert that it subscribes to cultural relativism and explains that 
according to its group norms, persons of Race Y within its territory are sub-human 
and can be eliminated without any violation of human rights. What can Government 
B say in reply? Government A’s cultural relativism is a form of subjectivism, 
according to which moral norms are relative to culture. However, if moral norms are 
truly relative to culture, Government B is not bound by the subjective view of 
Government A and can therefore step in to do what is right according to its own 
subjective view, which it can argue that Government A must accept since 
Government A endorses subjectivism and believes that culture is the source of moral 
norms. In this line of argumentation, Government B is holding Government A to its 
moral subjectivism, essentially saying that Government A must accept that 
Government B is therefore not bound by Government A’s merely subjective norms. 
Moral dialogue in fact breaks down as moral subjectivism leaves us with no means to 
resolve the conflict between contradictory norms.    
 
If Government A stays true to its subjectivism, can it offer no comeback? 
Government A might counter that it has not deviated from subjectivism if it argues 
that Government B is permitted to define rights for matters pertaining to people 
within the territory of Country B, but not beyond that. Government A might say that it 
has not stopped Government B from determining that persons of Race Y within 
Country B are not sub-human but entitled to human rights. There are, however, at 
least two problems with this line of argumentation. The first problem is that it would 
be unrealistic to delineate rights in this manner in an inter-connected world as acts 
involving people outside of one’s country may have effects within one’s country, 
although this is not implicated in this hypothetical scenario. The question as to which 
culturally relative rights prevail, if they are conflicting on an issue that impinges on 
the two countries, or their peoples, must be resolved. Such resolution would be 
impossible if both Government A and Government B stay true to moral subjectivism, 
as a meta-cultural standard which both reject is necessary for the resolution. The 
second and more critical problem is that true subjectivism cannot conceptually restrict 
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its adherents to a particular content of norms or their reach, such as that a government 
can only define rights for people within its territory. To insist on such a restriction is 
to concede that there is a non-subjective standard. As such, true subjectivism, taken to 
its logical conclusion, means its adherents do not have a comeback against their 
opponents in moral dialogue.  
 
Moral Subjectivism on an Individual Level  
 
The problem of moral dialogue breaking down between cultural relativists would 
recur in some form or other with all moral subjectivists.  
 
Suppose M does an act which R, a moral realist thinks is objectively wrong — that is, 
really wrong. R tells M off. M is a non-cognitivist who thinks that claims of right and 
wrong are merely sentiments, and cannot be true or false. M cannot conclude that R 
has done something really wrong to tell M off because all acts, including the act of R 
telling M off, are not really wrong. 
 
Suppose another moral subjectivist N thinks that moral judgments can be true or false 
according to individual perception, but not objectively or really so. Suppose that R 
thinks that N has done something wrong and insists on telling N so. N disagrees and 
thinks that according to N’s subjective moral standards, N has not done anything 
wrong. N might opine that moral subjectivism entails that R cannot tell N off, for two 
alternative reasons. The first reason is that N’s subjective moral norms stipulate that R 
cannot tell N off. If that is the reason, N should still not hold R to those merely 
subjective norms. By N’s own views, those norms are true for N but not necessarily 
for others. An alternative (and different) reason as to why N would think that moral 
subjectivism entails that R cannot tell N off is that N thinks that R’s moral judgment 
is merely R’s subjective opinion, given that there is no moral law to which individuals 
are subject. In the second case, N must ironically resort to a non-subjective norm that 
binds R. After all, if there is no objective moral law to which individuals are subject, 
R can do as R pleases. What would the content of such a non-subjective norm be? 
Such a norm perhaps accords primacy to the autonomy of individuals to determine 
what is right. But any such norm is unworkable when unpacked. If individuals may do 
as they please, everyone becomes equally worthless as others can do anything to them; 
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if, however, there are to be some constraints on one’s autonomy, these constraints 
usually add up to an elaborate moral law calling for respect for another’s physical 
integrity (if one cannot physically harm the other), property (if one cannot damage the 
other’s property), and so on. As long as the moral subjectivist admits of the primacy 
of autonomy whilst denying that all are equally worthless, the moral subjectivist turns 
out to be just another moral realist.  
 
Appeal of Moral Subjectivism 
 
Several reasons account for the appeal of moral subjectivism, namely, the existence of 
disagreement on moral issues; the fear of intolerance and hindrance of dialogue if one 
subscribes to moral realism; and the view that objective morality cannot be proven to 
exist. These reasons are in fact inconclusive as ‘arguments’ for moral subjectivism. I 
shall deal with each in turn.  
 
The existence of disagreement on moral issues debunks the existence of an objective 
morality only if objective morality is constituted by an inter-subjective consensus or 
agreement. According to moral realists, it is not: moral facts and properties exist that 
are independent of the subject. A disagreement about moral facts and properties is 
similar to a disagreement about the number of planets in the galaxy: it does not 
change the objective fact. Are there other explanations that account for the existence 
of disagreement? An alternative explanation is that one or more of the interlocutors 
are wrong. Moral realists can in fact offer several hypotheses for why we would 
disagree about moral facts and properties if they exist. First, even if moral facts and 
properties are accessible by ordinary persons through rational intuition, by reasoning 
from first principles, or through other means accessible to all, social conditioning or 
the mores of the times can pervert reason or the means of moral knowledge. Second, 
most, if not all, of us can attest to how we sometimes end up doing what we know to 
be wrong and insist we have done no wrong: we might sometimes give in to our 
passions or instincts, over the dictates of what appears to be our conscience or reason. 
Third, apart from the occasions when we give in to a moment of weakness, there are 
other occasions when we choose to do what we know to be wrong out of self-interest. 
For example, we break promises when it is inconvenient for us to keep them. Even if 
we can initially tell right from wrong, by a deliberate habit of continual wrongdoing 
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and self-justification, we would find that over time, our guilt is lessened and we no 
longer flinch when doing an act over which we had agonized the first time we had 
done it. Given our experiences, we should know enough not to attach too much 
significance to the presence of disagreement.  
 
Another reason for the appeal of moral subjectivism over moral realism is the fear 
that those who are of the view that an objective morality exists might be intolerant, 
not engage in moral dialogue, and imperiously impose their views on others. In the 
preceding parts, I have sought to demonstrate, however, that moral dialogue is in fact 
gravely limited amongst and with moral subjectivists. Some moral subjectivists might 
be circumspect about acting on merely subjective views, given that they acknowledge 
that these views are only true to them, but other moral subjectivists might not. 
Genuine endorsement of moral realism, in contrast, entails a commitment to 
deliberation. Moral realists rationally ought to be more circumspect about the 
possibility of being wrong if morality is not merely dependent on their beliefs. Moral 
judgments should therefore be held more provisionally if moral facts and properties 
exist independent of a subject’s thinking, making deliberation and hearing the other 
out more important. Unfortunately, the bad sheep — those who are bigoted and refuse 
to deliberate — give a bad name to moral realism.  But moral realists are not the only 
ones who can be bigoted and intolerant — subjectivists might be too.    
 
As for those moral subjectivists who choose to be circumspect about acting on their 
merely subjective moral opinions, there is a third reason for the appeal of moral 
subjectivism. It might lie in the belief that, as it is impossible to prove that objective 
morality exists, it would be safer not to act on moral judgments. Arguably, moral 
subjectivism, more so than moral realism, allows one to refrain from acting on one’s 
moral opinion, since that opinion is only true to one’s self. Some of the Hellenistic 
Sceptics took the view that suspension of judgment would ensure freedom from 
disturbance or ataraxia. The problem with morality, however, is that the refusal to act 
on a particular moral judgment might in some cases be equivalent to acting as if the 
opposite moral judgment were true. For example, if one withholds judgment on 
whether an act is wrong because it is impossible to prove that an objective morality 
exists, one might well act as if it is not wrong and do it. Notably, some Sceptics, such 
as Pyrrho, doubt the accuracy of both sense perceptions and judgments (including 
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moral judgments) but permit a statement to be made to the effect that something 
‘appears to be so’. Thus, it might be said that such persons could still act on their 
beliefs, whilst refraining from thinking that such beliefs accurately reflected objective 
moral facts and properties. That is precisely what some moral subjectivists end up 
doing. But surely it might not lend to ataraxia after all: revising one’s tentative 
subjective belief that one has already acted upon on an earlier date might be 
disturbing.  
 
Furthermore, it could be argued that it is somewhat strange to act on one’s moral 
opinion that an act is wrong, for example, while insisting that the act is not really 
wrong as a matter of objective truth — an oddity that philosophers such as Dworkin1 
have noted. I borrow Burnyeat’s example of a proposition such as, ‘the stick in the 
water is bent’, and his distinction between an impression and an assent to explain an 
aspect of the oddity. 2  In the case of the proposition relating to the stick, one’s 
impression and one’s assent can be different. One’s impression is based on one’s 
sense perception, in this case, of sight. But one can conclude that the stick in the water 
is not really bent because one is aware of the law of physics relating to the refraction 
of light. While Burnyeat dealt with philosophical propositions generally rather than 
moral judgments in particular, the difficulty of distinction between impression and 
assent can arguably apply to moral judgments. For moral subjectivists who do not 
think that moral opinions are mere sentiments but remain subjectivists, impressions of 
moral norms are formed through philosophical argument; for moral realists, moral 
facts and properties are also discerned through philosophical argument. Arguably, it is 
therefore odd (though not impossible) for the moral subjectivist to form a moral 
judgment through philosophical argument, but disbelieve that they have discerned 
moral facts and properties that are really so.  
 
A Squabble Amongst Moral Realists 
 
I have argued that when push comes to shove, some moral subjectivists turn out to be 
moral realists. The moral subjectivists who do not turn out to be moral realists are 
gravely limited in what they can argue for in a moral dialogue. Those who turn out to 
be moral realists are really contending with others over the content of moral norms. 
They seem, at first blush, to be moral subjectivists only because they are of the view 
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that individuals can decide what is right or wrong for themselves, and others cannot 
morally judge them because there is no moral law to which individuals are subject. 
But such a proposition is self-defeating: if there is no moral law to which individuals 
are subject, it is a free-for-all; the moral judgment of others cannot itself be morally 
critiqued. If, on the other hand, apparent moral subjectivists really extol the primacy 
of autonomy, they turn out to be moral realists committed to the primacy of 
autonomy. Moral realism committed to the primacy of autonomy is, on deeper 
analysis, untenable. While such primacy must have been derived from the equal moral 
worth of all individuals, it in fact renders all of them equally worthless unless there 
are limits to everyone’s autonomy. Those limits, if conceded, however, constitute an 
elaborate set of moral norms and render their adherents indistinguishable from 
avowed moral realists. Any further debate over the content of norms is a squabble 
within the family of moral realists.   
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